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ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Whether an injured party's valid claim under the "hit-and-run"
clause of Utah's uninsured motorist statute is barred unless there is
actual contact between the vehicle occupied by the injured party and
an unidentified vehicle which proximately causes the injury?

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

On September 4, 1982 an accident occurred involving a motor
vehicle insured by State Farm Fire and Casualty Company ("State
Farm") and a "hit-and-run" motor vehicle.

At the time the accident

occurred the Appellant, Lisa Marakis ("Marakis"), was a resident of
Carbon County, Utah.

The Respondent, State Farm, was at the time of

the accident and is at present a foreign corporation registered to do
business in the state of Utah.

State Farm has been licensed by the

State of Utah to issue policies of insurance for motor vehicles
pursuant to Utah law.
Prior to the accident, on or about March 25, 1982, State Farm
issued a policy of insurance to Marakis' grandparents, Harold J. and
Mary Fowler. (Record, Affidavit, Mary Fowler)

That policy, No. S06

3676-C25-44, covered a 1976 Datsun—identification number HLS30288408.
The Fowler's policy covered bodily injury to any of their relatives
occupying the Datsun provided that the injuries arose out of the
operation of the vehicle.

Pursuant to statutory mandate the policy

also provided for recovery in the event of ^a "hit-and-run" accident.
Utah's uninsured motorist statute does not define the term
1

"hit-and-run".

However, State Farm's insurance policy includes the

following in its definition of "uninsured motorist:11
2. a "hit-and-run" land motor vehicle whose owner
or driver remains unknown arid which strikes:
a. the insured or
b. the vehicle the insured is occupying
and causes bodily injury to the insured.
Section III—Uninsured Motor Vehicle—Coverage U
On the fourth day of September in 1982 Marakis was driving home
from work in the Fowler's Datsun.

As she approached a bend in the

road which curved sharply around a mountain she encountered an older
model, light colored, automobile which, in attempting to negotiate
the curve, crossed over to the wrong side of the road and came
directly toward Marakis, traveling in her lane.

To avoid the

impending head-on collision Marakis was forced to hug the far right
side of her lane—precariously close to the soft shoulder.

As a

result she began to lose control of the vehicle in the soft dirt.
Marakis alertly turned to left and accelerated slightly to regain
control of the vehicle.

Unexpectedly, her Datsun shot across to the

left side of the road and ran into a fence.

The other vehicle

continued on without stopping.
Marakis suffered bodily injury as a result of the negligent
operation of the unidentified vehicle and the Datsun she was driving
was also damaged.

As a result of the impact Marakis' collar bone was

broken and she suffered multiple lacerations.

Consequently, it was

quite some time before she was physically able to free the vehicle
from its impacted position.

Once the damaged vehicle was extricated,
2

however, Marakis immediately made her way to a phone booth and
reported the "hit-and-run" accident to the Utah Highway Patrol.
Marakis made a claim against State Farm for her special and
general damages on July 26, 1984, pursuant to the terms of the
insurance contract.

State Farm refused to pay the damages claiming

that Marakis' vehicle had failed to make contact with the
unidentified vehicle.

According to State Farm, the absence of

physical contact between the insured vehicle and the unknown vehicle
precluded any claim under the insurance contract.
Marakis filed a complaint against State Farm on October 16, 1984
in the Seventh Judicial District Court of Carbon County.
later State Farm answered that complaint.

Two months

Marakis subsequently filed

a Motion for Summary Judgment based upon her own affidavit and that
of her grandmother, Mary Fowler.

Four notices of this motion, as

well as a copy of the motion itself, were sent to State Farm's
attorney.

No objection or opposition to the motion was filed.

The Court entered a ruling in favor of Marakis declaring the
physical contact provision of State Farm's insurance provision "void
and unenforceable and against public policy." (Record, Ruling on
Motion for Summary Judgment, April 30, 1985 p.l)

The court entered a

judgment granting Summary Judgment in favor of Marakis on May 14,
1985.

Pursuant to that judgment the plaintiff requested a hearing on

damages.
After notices of the hearing were issued, State Farm responded on
June 1, 1985 by filing a Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief from Judgment.
A motion opposing such relief was promptly filed by Marakis.

State

Farm claimed that due to an unspecified and undocumented clerical
3

error and the preoccupation of its attorneys with other cases, the
four notices, as well as the standard correspondances from the court
and the plaintiff, went unnoticed.
Surprisingly, the court granted State Farm's motion.

State Farm

then filed its own motion for Summary Judgment premised upon its
policy provision limiting recovery for "hit-and-run" accidents to
those instances in which there is physical contact between the
insured's vehicle and the vehicle operated by an unknown
"hit-and-run" motorist.
In a questionable exercise of discretion tne court entirely
reversed its position.

The Summary Judgment granted in behalf of

Marakis was vacated and Summary Judgment was entered for State Farm.
The court held that "the unidentified vehicle is not a 'hit-and-run'
motor vehicle within the meaning of that term as used in Section
41-12-21.1, Utah Code Annotated, or within the generally accepted
meaning of the term." (Record, Judgment of July 17, 1985 p.3).

NATURE OF THE CASE

The Appellant brings this action before the Supreme Court of Utah
on Appeal from a Summary Judgment entered by the Seventh Judicial
District Court of Carbon County.

The Appellant opposes the District

Court's ruling on the physical contact requirement for "hit-and-run"
accidents claiming it to be an error of law.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
4

There is a lack of conscensus among state courts concerning the
physical contact requirement in "hit-and-run" cases.

This lack of

unanimity is due primarily to the fact that the courts are
interpreting different statutes.

Of' those states with statutes which

mirror Utah's Uninsured Motorist Statute the majority have rejected
the physical contact requirement as contrary to the purpose of the
statute.

In other states, judicial decisions upholding the physical

contact requirement on the basis of policies established prior to the
enactment of uninsured motorist legislation are being rejected by an
increasing number of courts.

This emerging majority of courts choose

to examine the origin and underlying purpose of uninsured motorist
legislation rather than the anachronistic policies of prior statutes
to guide their statutory interpretation.
Uninsured Motorist Statutes were enacted to close "gaps" in the
coverage offered by insurance companies—namely the optional nature
of such coverage and the contractual requirement of vehicular contact
as a requisite to recovery.

The prime concern of such legislation is

compensation for injuries inflicted by one from whom damages cannot
be recovered.

State Farm's contractual requirement of physical

contact reopens a gap intended to be closed by the uninsured motorist
legislation and contravenes the compensatory purpose of the statute.
The term "hit-and-run" does not imply physical contact.

Many

courts uphold the physical contact requirement on the premise that
"hit-and-run" is a synonym for physical contact.

Such an

interpretation ignores the contemporary usage of the term and has
been rejected by a majority of the state courts.
State Farm's own insurance contract uses "hit-and-run" as a broad

5

term which includes both contact and noncontact accidents and
accidents where the negligent motorist is known or unknown.

However,

the language in State Farm's contract limits coverage to those motor
vehicle accidents where there is physical contact and the negligent
drivers identity is unknown.

If "hit-and-run" did not have such a

broad meaning, the limiting language, which is to be construed
strictly against the drafter, would be superflous.
The sole justification for the vehicular contact requirement is
that it provides evidence of the collision and thereby deters
fraudulent claims.

However, the potential cost of such evidence

coupled with the probability that a collision could be fabricated and
used to perpetrate a fraud renders such evidence of dubious merit.
Removing the requirement of physical contact does not remove the
Plaintiff's burden of proof.

There are other more effective means by

which the plaintiff may substantiate her claim.

The plaintiff should

be allowed to carry the burden of proving the authenticity of her
claim using competent evidence without her claim being barred by her
failure to collide with the "hit-and-run" vehicle.
Utah's criminal "hit-and-run" statute does not require physical
contact as the standard for determining when one must stop and give
assistance.

It would be inconsistent to read such a requirement into

the "hit-and-run" clause of the uninsured motorist statute.
The purpose of the uninsured motorist statue is to require
insurance carriers to provide coverage for victims who are entitled
to, but cannot otherwise, collect damages.

Contractually requiring

physical contact as a condition precedent to recovery creates an
arbitrary barrier to the assertion of valid claims.
6

Any effort to do

so is therefore void.
ARGUMENT

There is no question that an insurance company is liable when an
insured motorist is injured in a vehicular collision with a negligent
uninsured motorist who is liable for the damage.

Each of the 50

States statutorily require that insurance carriers include uninsured
motorist coverage in their automobile liability insurance policies.
However, state legislatures have been less uniform in assigning
liability where the legal cause of a noncontact accident is an
unidentified motorist who has fled the scene.

Consequently, there

has been a lack of conscensus among the courts of various states as
to whether vehicular contact is a requisite to recovery.
While some courts have required actual physical contact between
the vehicle of the insured and the "hit-and-run" vehicle as a means
of avoiding fraudulent claims, others have negated the physical
contact requirement on the grounds that it contravenes the
compensatory purpose of the statute.

The latter assert that the

evidentiary function of the contact requirement is better served by
other means.

To understand these polar legal positions it is

necessary to go beneath the surface of the judicial decisions and
examine their legislative roots.
I. The Lack of Conscensus Among State Courts on the Physical Contact
Requirement is Attributable to the Difference in Statutes Being
Interpreted. The Differences Between These Statutes Must be
Considered in Interpreting Utah's Uninsured Motorist Statute.
The State Court's lack of unanimity on the "hit-and-run" contact
requirement stems from differences in the statutes being interpreted.
7

The legislative prescription has not been uniform and several
different types of Uninsured Motorist Statutes have emerged.
Statutory definitions of "hit-and-run" and "uninsured motorist"
differ from state to state and this difference in statutory language
has resulted in conflicting decisions by the courts of different
states regarding the contact requirement.
In Type One statutes, the term "hit-and-run" is included along
with the term "uninsured motorist" but is not defined.
states, including Utah, fall within this category.1

Thirteen
Type Two

statutes include the term "uninsured motorist" but exclude the term
"hit-and-run."

Sixteen states have adopted this statutory language.2

The type of statute adopted by the third group explicitly defines
the physical contact requirement.

Three states in this group

explicitly renounce any requirment of physical contact

while the

remaining twelve states presently require physical contact as a
condition precedent to recovery.

The fourth, and most progressive,

category consists of four states which allow the physical contact
requirement to be waived if competent evidence exists to corroborate
the claimant's account of the accident.^

The uninsured motorist

statutes of the two remaining states are unique and not readily
classifiable

however, it is important to note that both of these

states have rejected the requirement or physical contact as a
requisite to recovery under the Uninsured Motorist Statute.
The judicial decisions of jurisdictions with Type One and Type
Two statutes are relevant to the case at bar.
Of the thirteen jurisdictions with Type One Statutes (statutes
like Utah's which employ but do not define the term "hit-and-run")
8

nine have ruled on the physical contact requirement. Of those nine,
7
six have invalidated the requirement
while only three have failed
g
to reject it.
Due to the clarity of the statutory language there
has been greater harmony among the judicial decisions rendered in
states with Type One statutes than among the decisions of courts
interpreting other statutes.
The legislative inclusion of the term "hit-and-run" together with
the exclusion of any requirement of physical contact gives the court
interpretive guidance in that it manifests a deliberate attempt to
close all of the "gaps" in uninsured motorist coverage.

Those courts

which have rejected the vehicular contact requirement have done so on
the basis of a carefully reasoned review of the underlying purpose of
the legislation.

Conversely, those courts in jurisdictions with Type

One statutes which have upheld the physical contact requirement have
q

done so on the basis of shallow analysis or careless logic.
Fourteen of the sixteen states with Type Two statutes have ruled
on the physical contact requirement.

The resulting case law

represents an even split in authority—seven choosing to reject the
10
contact requirement with seven clinging to the anachronistic
11
policies of earlier statutes.
While the courts in Type Two
jurisdictions which have rejected the vehicular contact requirement
have looked carefully at the statute's origin and the legislative
intent to resolve the question of liability, those not rejecting it
have rested their decisions on a logical framework supported by three
presumptions.

First, that there is no legislative intent supporting

another construction.

Second, that the result of such an

interpretation does not lead to an absurd result.
9

And third, that

without definite information as to the unknown motorist's insurance
status he is presumed to be insured. See Balestrieri v. Hartford
Accident & Indemnity Insurance Company, 112 Ariz. 160, 540 P.2d 126
(Ariz. 1975).(These presumptions were refuted by the dissent in
Anderson v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 133 Ariz.
12
464, 652 P.2d 537 (Ariz. 1982)).
This logical framework does not withstand close scrutiny.

First,

as is discussed below, the legislative intent undergirding the
Uninsured Motorist Statute supports an opposite construction than
that advocated by proponents of the contact requirement.
Second, such an interpretation does lead to an absurd result.

In

the instant case, had the vehicle fled the scene after colliding with
Marakis' vehicle, Marakis could recover.

However, Marakis' efforts

to avoid contact with the vehicle would bar recovery in spite of
competent evidence to substantiate her claim.

This interpertation

forces a driver to risk injury via collision to insure recovery.
Such an interpretation is absurd.
Finally, a presumption that a driver who leaves the scene of an
accident is insured defies common sense.

An insured motorist would

be more likely to stop and identify himself than would an uninsured
motorist.

If a motorist does not stop and identify himself after an

accident the most logical presumption, absent evidence to the
contrary, is that the motorist is not insured.
In the Motion for Summary Judgment granted by the court below,
the Respondent offered a lengthy list of decisions by state courts
which had upheld the vehicular contact requirement.

However, the

Respondent did not point out to the court that many of those cases
10

involved statutes explicitly requiring contact between the vehicle of
an uninsured motorist and that of a "hit-and-run" motorist as a
condition precedent to recovery.

Nor did the respondent acknowledge

that the majority of state courts interpreting statutes like Utah's
Uninsured Motorist Statute (Type One statutes) had soundly rejected
the contact requirement as contrary to the purpose of the statute.
Indeed, an emerging majority of courts, after reviewing the origins
of the Uninsured Motorist Legislation have rejected the requirement
of vehicular contact.
II. State Farm's Contractual Requirement of Physical Contact
Contravenes the Policy Which Undergirds Utah's Uninsured Motorist
Statute.
A. The Origin and Purpose of Uninsured Motorist Legislation
The origin of uninsured motorist legislation is not complex.

The

rapid increase in the number of automobiles in America following the
end of World War II resulted in a dramatic increase in the incidence
of automobile accidents.

"The inadequacy of the then-existing state

laws, which had attempted to eliminate the problem either by
encouraging or in some states by requiring motorists to secure
insurance, became very apparent." A. Widiss, Uninsured and
Underinsured Motorist Insurance, 3 (2d ed. 1985)[hereinafter cited as
Widiss].

As legislatures attempted to resolve the inherent

difficulties of the existing statutes a debate arose as to whether
control over driving privileges or compensation of victims was the
proper course to pursue. Widiss at 6-7.
Initially, the new generation of statutes focused upon inducing
motorists to obtain insurance and revoking the driving privileges of
financially irresponsible tortfeasors. Murphy and Netherton, Public
11

Responsibility and the Uninsured Motorist, 47 Georgetown L.J. 700
(1959).

While the debates in the public sector continued, a more

innovative private sector turned this newly created entrepeneurial
opportunity to their advantage.

In State Farm Fire and Casualty

Company v. Lambert, 285 So.2d 917 (Ala. 1973), the Supreme Court of
Alabama explained;
A progressive and an imaginative insurance industry
moved into this gap and provided, as optional
coverage, uninsured motorist protection. The
responsible motorist was now able for a nominally
increased premium to cover not only his liability
to others but protect himself from the loss due to
personal injury incurred through the fault of the
financially irresponsible. These irresponsible
motorists fall basically into two categories—the
known driver and the unknown driver (hit-and-run).
While the gap was narrowed, it was not fully
bridged. Two deficiencies yet remained: (1) the
uninsured motorist coverage was purely contractual
and thus wholly optional, and (2) by the terms of
the policy the insured's protection against
hit-and-run drivers was conditioned on physical
contact of the vehicles involved.
Lambert at 919. (emphasis added)
In the late 1950's state legislatures began closing these "gaps".
Insurance carriers were required to provide coverage for victims of
automobile accidents who had valid claims but were unable to collect
from the offending motorist.

The coverage was no longer optional and

the first gap was undisputably closed.

However, in 1973, Alabama's

Supreme Court had to decide whether the second "gap"—recovery in
"hit-and-run" situations contingent on physical contact between the
vehicles involved—had also been closed by the mandatory uninsured
motorist legislation.

Recognizing that the question could not be

answered "apart from the historical context within which the statute
12

was passed/1 Lambert at 918, the court carefully explained its
decision;
In light of this historical perspective, and
working within the traditional fault concept, the
legislature passed the Uninsured Motorist Statute.
By requiring each policy to include such coverage—
absent an express disavowal on the part of the
insured—the gap represented by the first
deficiency was further narrowed. It is equally
clear that the statute in providing "for the
protection of persons insured thereunder who are
legally entitled to recover damages from owners or
operators of uninsured motor vehicles" speaks
directly to the second deficiency—the unknown or
hit-and-run as well as the known financially
irresponsible driver.
To hold that the legislative intent had the
restrictive effect of speaking only to the first of
the two above-referred to deficiencies is to
dispute that the purpose of the statute is to
protect persons who are injured through the fault
of other motorists who in turn are not insured and
cannot make whole the injured party. The design of
the statute is to protect injured persons who can
prove that the accident did in fact occur and that
he was injured as a proximate result of the
negligence of such other motorist who cannot
respond in damages for such injuries.
Lambert at 919.
After reiterating that .contract provisions which were more
restrictive than were the statutory provisions were not valid, the
court answered the physical contact question directly;
We hold, therefore, that the "physical contact"
requirement in the "hit-and-run" provision of the
automobile liability insurance policies here under
consideration is in derogation of the Alabama
Uninsured Motorist Statute and is void as against
public policy.
Lambert at 920. See also, Montoya v. Dairyland
Insurance Company, 394 F.Supp. 1337 (Dist.Ct. N.M.
1975)(the physical contact requirement was in
derogation of the remedial nature of the statute
and the legislative intent not to allow the
creation of a gap in the coverage.)
13

In Farmers Insurance Exhange v. McDermott, 527 P.2d 918
(Colo.App. 1974) , Colorado's Court of Appeals echoed the Alabama
Court's interpretation of the statutory language and elaborated upon
its application;
. • . the key to the application of the uninsured
motorist statute is the inability of the innocent
injured party to recover for a loss caused by
another's negligence, whether that person is known
or unknown. There can be no doubt as to the
liability of the errant driver here, had his
identity been known. While the language of the
statute focuses on the problems of an uninsured
motor vehicle, its applicability is not limited to
those situations in which the identity of the
negligent party is known. Furthermore, the
declaration of public policy expresses the
legislature's prime concern as the need to
compensate the innocent driver for injuries
received at the hands of one from whom damages
cannot be recovered.
McDermott at 920. (emphasis added).
By enacting an uninsured motorist statute, Utah, along with the
other states, declared that its prime concern is the need to
compensate the victim for injuries inflicted by one from whom damages
cannot be recovered.

Uninsured motorist coverage is no longer solely

a matter to be contracted between parties.

Insurance carriers must

provide coverage for those injured by tortfeasors from whom they
13
cannot recover.
The question a court must answer before allowing recovery is not
whether there was contact between the vehicles but rather, as the
Supreme court of Florida explained;
. . .the question to be answered is whether the
offending motorist has insurance available for the
protection of the injured party, for whose benefit
the statute was written; . . . Any other
construction of the statute is unfair and unduly
restricts the application intended by the
14

legislature.
Brown v. Progressive Mutual Insurance Company, 249
So.2d 429,430 (Pla. 1971).
In 1984 Idaho's intermediate appellate court rejected the
physical contact provision contained in an insurance carrier's
policy.

In Hammon v. Farmers Insurance Group, 692 P.2d 1202 (Idaho

App. 1984), the court carefully reviewed the opposing views of stat
courts with statutes similar to their own and chose to follow the
better reasoned view of the emerging majority;
We choose to follow the view that uninsured
motorist statutes were enacted to "expand insurance
protection to the public who use the streets or
highways." (Citation Omitted). A contractual
requirement of physical contact "unjustifiably
impedes effectuation of the statutory policy of
protection for insured against damage from the
negligence of unidentified drivers." (Citation
Omitted). Therefore, we hold that the physical
contact requirement in the uninsured motorist
section of this policy is contrary to I.e. S
41-2502. Consequently, it is void. The Hammons
•are entitled to litigate the merits of their claim
notwithstanding the lack of physical contact with
the unidentified vehicle.
Hammon at 1207. See also, DeMello v. First
Insurance Company of Hawaii, 55 Hawaii at 524, 523
P.2d at 310 (Hawaii 1974).
The cases cited above were interpreting Type Two statutes which
are more vague than is Utah's Type One statute.

Courts construing

Type One Statutes with language that is similar, if not identical,
the language of the Utah statute agree with the courts cited above
that the purpose of the uninsured motorist statute is to compensate
those who are entitled, but unable, to collect from the tortfeasor.
In Surrey v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Company, 384 Mass. 171
424 N.E.2d 234 (Mass. 1981), the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts (a Type One jurisdiction) stated;
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The aim of the uninsured motorist statute is to minimize
the catastrophic financial loss for victims of
automobile accidents caused by the negligence of
uninsured tortfeasors, (citations omitted). We believe
it is wholly inconsistent with this broad remedial
purpose to permit the insurer to evade mandated coverage
by erecting an artificial, arbitrary barrier.
Surrey at 238. See, Pin Pin H. Su v. Kemper Insurance
Companies/ American Motorists Insurance Company, 431
A.2d 416,419 (R.I. 1981)(If one views the situation in
light of this statutory purpose, it seems wholly
inappropriate to allow an insurance company to deny
coverage on the sole ground of lack of physical
contact); Biggs v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Company, 569 P.2d 432 (Okla. 1977)(it would
defeat the purpose of the statute to allow insurance
contracts to require impact before coverage would be
extended to their insured.); Soule v. Stouyvesant
Insurance Company, 364 A.2d 416 (N.H. 1976)(Uninsured
motorist protection is designed to compensate persons
for losses which would otherwise go uncompensated
because of the tortfeasor's lack of insurance or unknown
identity) and Clark v. Regent Insurance Company, 270
N.W.2d 26 (S.D. 1978)(Purpose of uninsured motorist
statute is to provide same protection from injury by
uninsured or unknown motorist as would be available had
the tortfeasor been known or insured.).
In jurisdictions with Type One statutes, a clear majority of the
courts have rejected the physical contact requirement, holding that
it is in derogation of the very purpose of the statute.

Of the

courts interpreting the more vague Type Two statutes, those who have
examined the policies which led to the enactment of the statute have
also rejected the contact requirement.

If we eliminate from the

tally those states which explicitly define the contact requirement,
the majority of states hold that the physical contact requirement
contravenes the purpose for which uninsured motorist statutes were
enacted.
B. "Hit-and-Run" is not Synonymous With Physical Contact.
Many courts which uphold the physical contact requirement do so
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on the premise that the term "hit-and-run" is synonomous with
physical contact.

In Ferega v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Company,

303 N..E.2d 459 (111. App. 1973), (a Type One jurisdiction) Illinois'
intermediate appellate court failed to reject the physical contact
requirement because "The use of the words 'hit-and-run vehicle' by
the legislature seems to indicate a policy having to do with
'hitting,f which is spelled out as physical impact." Ferega at 461.
Such a rigid construction implies that the meaning of the phrase
"hit-and-run" has not expanded or changed since it was first employed
by baseball players.

This construction ignores the evolution of

usage and the adaptability of language to contemporary circumstances.
For example, the term "hit-below-the-belt" was coined by boxers
to designate an illegal blow or hit.
meaning to take unfair advantage.

The term is now a cliche'

No hit is required for the term to

be effective.

Evans and Evans, A Dictionary of Contemporary American

Usage (1957).

Similarly, the term "hit-and-run" now characterizes an

accident which is caused by one who subsequently leaves the scene
without identifying himself.

Its contemporary usage no longer

requires nor implies that an actual "hit" occur.

It is this

contemporary usage which has been adopted by most courts.
In Surrey v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Company, 424 N.E.2d 234
(Mass. 1981), the plaintiff was forced off the road and into a guard
rail by an automobile coming from the opposite direction.

The

operator or owner of the other car was not identified and there was
no physical contact between the insured vehicle and the "hit-and-run"
vehicle.

The defendant-insurer urged a strict construction of the

term "hit-and-run" arguing that it was synonomous with "physical
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contact".

The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts rejected such

a construction as improper.

The court explained;

The question sub judice, a matter of first
impression in the Commonwealth, has been considered
by numerous jurisdictions. Our review of those
cases indicated that the defendant's position is no
longer supported by the majority of the courts, nor
is it sustained by a proper view of the legislative
intent.
Surrey at 236.
The court then adopted the better reasoned view of the emerging
majority;
. . . we conclude that physical contact is not part
of the usual and accepted meaning of the term
"hit-and-run."
Surrey at 238.
Rhode Island's Supreme Court explained that the common meaning of
"hit-and-run" had changed since its inception and was broader than
the defendant claimed.

The court stated;

In interpreting the language "hit and run" we
believe, as did the Supreme Court of Washington,
that the term is merely a shorthand colloquial
expression that is designed to describe a motorist
who has caused, or contributed by his negligence
to, an accident and flees the scene without being
identified. Thus, there is no inherent connotation
that physical contact is an essential part of its
definition.
Pin Pin H. Su at 419. See Halseth v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 268 N.W.2d 730
(Minn. 1978)(The term 'hit-and-run' is synonymous
with a vehicle involved in an accident causing
damages where the driver flees from the scene,
regardless of whether or not physical contact
between that vehicle and the insured's automobile
occurs.). See also, DeMello v. First Insurance
Company of Hawaii, Ltd., 55 Hawaii 519, 523 P.2d
304 (Hawaii 1974)(Since it is clear that one car
accidents can be caused by the negligent operation
of a second "uninsured" vehicle any contractual
prerequisite of physical contact between
automobiles undermines the statutory proposes of
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HRS S 431-448.).
A "hit-and-run" motor vehicle accident describes an accident
caused by a motorist who has fled the scene.
of vehicular contact.

There is no requirement

To require physical contact re-opens one of

the "gaps" in coverage that the statute was designed to close.

The

Minnesota Supreme Court best explained the inconsistent consequence
of inserting the physical contact requirement into the uninsured
motorist statute;
Obviously, if an insured could recover damages from
a known tortfeasor despite the lack of physical
contact between his and the insured's vehicles, the
insured's uninsured motorist coverage should apply
when the tortfeasor is an unknown hit-and-run
driver.
Halseth at 733.
Had Marakis collided with the unidentified vehicle she could
recover regardless of her ability to identify either the driver or
the vehicle.

If she could identify the vehicle or its driver she

would be compensated for her injuries even though there was no
vehicular contact.

However, she has fallen into a coverage "gap"

arbitrarily created by State Farm's insurance contract.

Her claim is

barred by her inability to identify the tortfeasor and her
unwillingness to collide with the vehicle which caused the accident.
This was not the intent of the uninsured motorist legislation and
a proper construction of the term "hit-and-run" would avoid such a
result.

Defining "hit-and-run" as requiring physical contact would

contravene the very purpose of the statute.
III. There Are Less Harsh and More Effective Means of Detering Fraud
than The Physical Contact Requirement
The sole justification for the physical contact requirement is
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its alleged evidentiary function.

It has been argued that a

collision provides objective evidence which corroborates the victim's
account of the accident.•Grace v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
insurance Company, 197 Neb. 118,121, 246 N.W.2d 874,877 (Neb. 1976).
However, the potential cost of this evidence raises serious doubts
concerning its merits.
In Surrey, the defendant-insurer claimed that the physical
contact requirement served to prevent fraudulent claims by requiring
tangible proof of collision.

The court rejected this argument in

favor of a more cogent view;
This argument succumbs to the overriding purpose of
the legislation. Furthermore, elimination of this
arbitrary physical contact requirement does not
diminish the plaintiff's burden to prove that the
accident actually did occur as she says. We adopt
the emerging and better reasoned view of the
claimant's evidentiary burden, . . . .
Surrey at 238.
In Brown v. Progressive Mutual Insurance Company, 249 So.2d 429, 430
(Fla. 1971), the Florida Supreme Court was less tactful than was the
Massachusetts court.

The Florida Court rejected outright the

validity of the physical contact requirement;
The argument that the policy requirement of
physical contact is reasonable is fallacious. The
only reason for such a requirement is to prove that
the accident actually did occur as a claimant may
say it did. This is a question of fact to be
determined by the jury, or the judge if demand for
jury trial is not made. If the injured party can
sustain the burden of proof that an accident did
occur, he should be entitled to recover, regardless
of the actuality of physical contact.
Brown at 430.
Hawaii's Supreme Court took this argument a step further suggesting
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that contact requirement could be used to perpetrate fraud;
We also note the clear possibility of instances in
which the contractually imposed requirement will
not fulfill its.justifiable objective of
eliminating fraudulent claims. A claimant with a
fraudulent claim can bolster the same, if
necessary, by damaging his own car to leave
apparent proof of the requisite "physical impact"
with a non-existant "unidentifiable vehicle." The
contractual "physical impact" requirement thus not
only sweeps too broadly, but also not broadly
enough to accomplish its only justifiable and
statutorily permissible purpose, the prevention of
frauds.
DeMello v. First Insurance Company of Hawaii, Ltd.,
523 P.2d 304 (Hawaii 1974).
The physical contact requirement is not a deterent to fraudulent
claims.

A motorist clever enough to contrive a scheme to defraud an

insurer could easily fabricate the collision and collect on his
uninsured motorist coverage.

But the alert driver who avoids a

collision because he is more concerned with saving his life than
preserving his coverage cannot collect under State Farm's statutory
construction.
If the plaintiff can prove that there was an accident caused by
an unindentified vehicle her claim should not be barred by his
ability to avoid collision.

In Biggs v. State Farm Mutual Automobile

Insurance Company, 569 P.2d 432 (Okla. 1977), the Supreme Court of
Oklahoma admitted that the plaintiff bore the burden of proving an
accident occured but argued that he should be allowed to carry that
burden.

The court stated;
Admittedly, the burden of proof will be upon the
insured to show that the accident was in fact
caused by an unidentified driver, but this
opportunity cannot be denied just because there was
no 'impact' with the offending car.
Biggs at 433.
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The rejection of the physical contact requirement does not
relieve the burden of proving the case.

The statute only provides

coverage for those who are "legally entitled to recover". U.C.A. 8
42-12-21.2 (1953, enacted 1967).

There are other evidentiary sources

which are less harmful than the requirement of vehicular contact and
more effective in terms of proving or disproving the plaintiff's
claim.
In a fact situation similar to the instant case The Supreme Court
of Rhode Island listed some of the alternative evidentiary sources
and processess available to both parties;
We recognize the possibility of fraudulent claims
but believe that the element of physical contact is
not of significant relevance in the identification
and resistance of such claims. The presence or
absence of impartial witnesses, the credibility of
the claimant's testimony, the ability of the
cross-examiner to expose prevarication are all far
more efficient tools of the adversary process to
expose fraud in this context.
Pin Pin H. Su at 419.
In Clark v. Regent Insurance Company, 270 N.W.2d 26 (1978), the
plaintiff was forced, as was Marakis, to swerve to avoid a head-on
collision between her motor vehicle and an unidentified motor
vehicle.

The plaintiff was injured but there was no physical contact

between the vehicles.
The defendant argued that not requiring physical contact would
result in a flood of fraudulent claims.

The court responded;

The contention that the physical contact
requirement prevents fraudulent claims appears to
be of dubious merit. We have not found any signs
of a flood of "phantom vehicle" claims in the
states rejecting the requirement, nor have the
legislatures of those states found it necessary to
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enact a physical contact requirement to their
uninsured motorist statutes. We perceive no sound
reason to deprive an injured insured of recompense
for a valid claim to prevent the "flood of
fraudulent claims" which has not materialized in
other states.
Clark at 30.
The physical contact requirement has no merit.

The requirement

of physical contact may itself be used to perpetrate fraud rather
than deter it.

There are more reliable evidentiary sources.

If a

plaintiff can prove, to the satisfaction of a judge or jury, that the
accident occurred as she testifies that it did, she should not have
to risk serious injury or death before being allowed to assert her
claim.

IV. The Uninsured Motorist Provision of the Defendant's Insurance
Policy Defines "Hit-and-Run" as a Broad Term Which is Not Synonymous
With Physical Contact.

State Farm's contract provides coverage for damage done by
"hit-and-run" motorists.

The contract does not provide coverage for

all "hit-and-run" cases, however, it covers only those accidents
involving;
2. a "hit-and-run" land motor vehicle whose owner or driver
remains unknown and which strikes:
a. the insured or
b. the vehicle the insured is occupying
and causes bodily injury to the insured.
Section III—Uninsured Motor Vehicle—Coverage U
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The commonly accepted meaning of the term "hit-and-run"
encompasses more than a contact accident where the driver remains
unknown.

If the phrase "hit-and-run" does not have a broader meaning

which includes noncontact accidents, then the limiting language of
the contract is superflous.

The language of the contract itself,

which is to be construed strictly against the drafter, Hoffman v.
Life Insurance Company of North America, 669 P.2d 410 (Utah 1983),
implies that the term "hit-and-run" includes accidents involving both
known and unknown drivers as well as contact and noncontact
accidents.

State Farm has simply chosen to limit its coverage to a

smaller group of "hit-and-run" cases than is provided for by
statute—namely cases where the "hit-and-run" driver is unknown and
there has been physical contact between the vehicles.
The purpose of Utah's Uninsured Motorist Statute is to require
that insurance carriers provide coverage for persons injured by
motorists from whom they are entitled to recover damages but from
whom they are unable collect.

Whether the insured is unable to

collect because the tortfeasor is uninsured or unknown is not
material to the statute's purpose since a driver who leaves the scene
of an accident and cannot be located is for all practical purposes
"uninsured." Hammon v. Farmers Insurance Group, 692 P.2d 1202,1206
(Idaho Ct. App. 1984)(no genuine distinction between the harm caused
by known or unknown motorist).

Any attempt to place contractual

limitations on this statutory coverage are void. Brown v. United
Services Automobile Association, 684 P.2d 1195 (Okla. 1984).
If Marakis could identify the offender whose negligence
proximately caused her injuries, she could recover.
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If she had

crashed head-on into the "older model, light colored" automobile
State Farm would pay the claim.

However, State Farm's policy

restricts its uninsured motorist coverage to those cases in which
contact occurs.

Thus the policy affords less coverage than the

statute provides and is therefore void.
V. Criminal "Hit-and-Run" Statutes Which Make Leaving The Scene Of An
Accident A Criminal Offense Do Not Require Physical Contact.
Statutes have been enacted by the legislatures of a majority of
the states requiring a person involved in an accident to stop and
"give certain information, and render aid to those who have been
injured." 23 A.L.R. 3d 497, 500.

"Familiarly known as "hit-and-run"

statutes, these acts generally make the failure to so perform, when
the circumstances envisioned by the statutory scheme occur, a felony
or misdemeanor." 23 A.L.R. 3d 497, 500.
Utah has such a statute.

Section 41-6-29 of the Utah Code

provides;
The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident
resulting in injury to or death of any person shall
immediately stop such vehicle at the scene of such
accident or as close thereto as possible but shall
then forthwith return to and in every event shall
remain at the scene of the accident until he has
fulfilled the requirements of section 41-6-31.
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, S 41-6-29(a)(as ammended
1977).
Section 41-6-31 specifies the information and aid that must be
given.

Section 41-6-32 makes a similar requirement of "the driver of

any vehicle which collides with or is involved in an accident with
any vehicle or other property which is unattended which results in
damage to the other vehicle or property. . . . "
The Utah legislature did not require that the operator of a motor
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vehicle make contact with another vehicle before he is required to
stop and render assistance.

The courts of other states have

similarly ruled that the essence of the offense is not the contact
between the vehicles.

"The gravamen of the offense is failure to

stop and provide identification ... and to be available to render
assistance if required." State v. Vela, 656 P.2d 536,537 (Wash. App.
1983). Accord, People v. Holford, 403 P.2d 423 (Cal. 1965).

New

Hampshire's Supreme Court has held;
RSA 262-A:67 (Supp.1975), as is the case with
'hit-and-run' statutes generally, imposes its
requirements on any motor vehicle operator who is
'in any manner involved' in an accident, without
reference to physical contact.
Soule at 885.
The court then explained that the defendant-insurer's "attempted
limitation" by contract of the "statutory coverage to less than that
required" by the statute was "ineffective"

because the phrase

"hit-and-run" was not intended to require physical contact. Soule at
885.
Utah's legislature realized that accidents could be caused by
motor vehicles which have no physical contact with the other vehicle
or vehicles involved.

The language "which collides with or is

involved in an accident with" is indicative of this understanding.
Since the Utah legislature does not require physical contact as the
standard for determining when one must stop and give assistance, it
would be inconsistent to read such a requirement into the
"hit-and-run" clause of the uninsured motorist statute.
VI. The Limiting Provision of State Farm's Insurance Contract is an
Artificial and Arbitrary Barrier to Meritorious Claims and is
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Therefore Void.
The purpose of the uninsured motorist statute is to require
insurance carriers to provide coverage for the victims who are
entitled to, but cannot collect, damages.

Upholding the physical

contact requirement is more than an innocuous misconstruction of
legislative directive.

Upholding the contact requirement creates

arbitrary barrier to the assertion of valid claims.

The Supreme

Court of Hawaii noted;
For us to enforce insurer's physical impact
contractual prerequisite would, in effect, amount
to our propping up of an arbitrary barricade
erected to eliminate all claims for damages
resulting from one car accidents. Since it is
clear that one car accidents can be caused by the
negligent operation of a second "uninsured" vehicle
(as here) any contractual prerequisite of physical
contact between automobiles undermines the
statutory purposes of HRS S 431-448.
DeMello at 308. See Surrey at 238. (We believe it
is wholly inconsistent with this broad remedial
purpose to permit the insurer to evade mandated
coverage by erecting an artificial, arbitrary
barrier.) .
New Hampshire pursued a similar analysis, noting that other
legislatures had deliberately inserted a requirement of physical
contact while New Hampshire's had not;
The New Hampshire legislature chose not to
insert a physical contact requirement into RSA
268:15-a (Supp. 1975) as has been done in some
other jurisdictions, (citation omitted). Instead
our statute mandates compulsory coverage to "all
persons who are legally entitled to recover
damages" from uninsured motorists and hit-and-run
drivers. The statute thus extends coverage to all
accidents caused by uninsured motorists or
hit-and-run motorists without any requirement of
physical contact.
Soule v. Stuyvesant Insurance Company, 364 A.2d
883, 884 (1976). See also, Pin Pin H. Su at
419. (We are of the opinion that the policy
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requirement of physical contact is void as against
the policy inherent in the uninsured-motorist
statute.), and Lambert at 920. (We hold,
therefore, that the "physical contact" requirement
is in derogation of the Uninsured Motorist Statute
and is void as against public policy.).
Utah's uninsured motorist statute, like New Hampshire's statute,
provides coverage for those legally entitled to recover damages from
uninsured motorists and hit-and-run motor vehicles. U.C.A. S
41-12-21.1 (1953, enacted 1967).

It should be similarly construed to

provide the full protection envisioned by its drafters.

Had the

legislature intended to bar the claims of a select group of
motorists express provisions would have been made for such exclusion.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania summed up the practical effect
of upholding the contact requirement in Webb v. United States
Automobile Association, 227 Pa. Super. 508, 323 A.2d 737 (1974). The
court explained;
If the legislature intended to "provide
protection to innocent victims of irresponsible
drivers," (citation omitted), it could not also
intend that the motorist faced with the decision
whether to collide with another vehicle or to avoid
it should choose to collide or else lose his
protection. Webb at 743.
State Farm's insurance provision requiring physical contact bars
the legimate and evidentially sound claims of an arbitrarily selected
group of motorists—those who have not collided with the offending
vehicle.

This barrier is artificial as it was not intended by the

legislature nor is it supported by the statute.
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CONCLUSION
Utah's Uninsured Motorist Statute does not require physical contact as a condition precedent to recovery in a "hit-andrun" situation.

The lower court's grant of a Summary Judgment

in favor of respondent was an error of law.

The judgment of the

lower court should be reversed and this case should be remanded
to the Seventh Judicial District Court of Carbon County where
the Appellant can present evidence to sustain her burden of proof
as to the authenticity of her claim.
DATED this j^> day of January, 1986.

WAYp^B. WATSON, P.C.
Attorney for Appellant
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ENDNOTES

1 Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Hampshire,
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont,
Wisconsin. See appendix A

2 Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii,
Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Montana, New Mexico, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Wyoming See Appendix B

3 Delaware, Missouri, Virginia. See Appendix C

The legislatures enacting Type Two statutes either neglected to
include the term "hit-and-run" or assumed, as many courts have
held, that the term "uninsured motorist" included all motorists
from whom injured motorists were unable to collect.

4 Alaska, California, Iowa, Michigan, Mississippi, Nevada, New York,
North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, West Virginia.
See Appendix C

5 Georgia, Oregon, Washington, Kansas. See Appendix D

6 Maryland and New Jersey. See Appendix E

7 Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, Rhode Island and
South Dakota
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8 Illinois, Nebraska and Wisconsin

9 See, Ferega v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Company, 303 N.E.2d 459
(111. App. 1973); Grace v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Company, 197 Neb. 118, 246 N.W.2d 874 (Neb. 1976) and Hayne v.
Progressive Northern Insurance Company, 339 N.W.2d 588 (Wis. 1983)o

10 Alabama, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, New Mexico and
Pennsylvania.

11 Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana and
Ohio

12

See also, Ward v. Consolidated Underwriters, 535 S.W.2d 830 (Ark.
1976); Rosnick v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Company, 374 A.2d 1076
(Conn. 1976); Jett v. Doe, 551 S.W.2d 221,223 (Ky. 1977); Tyler v.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 290 So.2d 388
(La.App 1974) and Travelers Indemnity Company v. Reddick, 37 Ohio
St.2d 119, 308 N.E.2d 454,457 (Ohio 1974).

13 Unless such coverage is expressely waived by the insured. See
Utah Code Annotated, 8 42-12-21.1 (1953, enacted 1967).
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APPENDIX A
I. STATUTES USING THE PHRASE "HIT AND RUN" WITHOUT DEFINING THE TERM.
ILLINOIS: 111. Ann. Stat. Ch. 73,
755a (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984).
. . . [f]or the protection of persons insured thereunder who are
legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of
uninsured motor vehicles and hit-and-run motor vehicles because o
bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death resulting
therefrom,. . .
MAINE: Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 24A, S 2902 (Supp. 1984).
. . . [f]or the protection of persons insured thereunder who are
legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of
uninsured, underinsured or hit-and-run motor vehicles, for bodily
injury, sickness or disease, including death, resulting from the
ownership, maintenance or use of such uninsured, underinsured or
hit-and-run motor vehicle.
MASSACHUSETTS: Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch 175,
113L (West Supp. 1984).
. . . [f]or the protection of persons insured thereunder who are
legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of
uninsured motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers and
hit-and-run motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness or
disease, including death resulting therefrom,...
MINNESOTA: Minn. Stat. Ann. s 65B.49(4) (Supp. 1985).
. . . [f]or the protection of persons insured thereunder who are
legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of
uninsured motor vehicles and hit-and-run motor vehicles because o
injury.
NEBRASKA: Neb. Rev. Stat. S 60-509.01 (Reissue 1984).
. . . [f]or the protection of persons insured thereunder who are
legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of
uninsured motor vehicles and hit-and-run motor vehicles because o
bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death resulting
therefrom;
NEW HAMPSHIRE: N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. S 264:15 (1982).
. . . [f]or the protection of persons insured thereunder who are
legally entitled to recover damages from owners or drivers of
uninsured motor vehicles, and hit-and-run vehicles because of
bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death resulting
therefrom.
NORTH DAKOTA: N.D. Cent. Code S 26-02-42 (Supp. 1983).
. . . [f]or the protection of persons insured thereunder who are
legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of
uninsured motor vehicles and hit-and-run jnotor vehicles because o
bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death resulting
therefrom.
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OKLAHOMA: Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 36,
3636 (West Supp. 1984).
(B) The policy referred to in subsection (A) of this section shall
provide coverage therein or supplemental thereto for the
protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled
to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor
vehicles and hit-and-run motor vehicles because of bodily injury,
sickness or disease, including death resulting therefrom.
RHODE ISLAND: R.I. Gen. Laws S 27-7-2.1 (Reenactment 1979).
. . . [f]or the protection of persons insured thereunder who are
legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of
uninsured motor vehicles and hit-and-run motor vehicles because of
property damage, bodily injury, sickness or disease, including
death resulting therefrom, provided that the named insured shall
have the right to reject such coverage, or that portion thereof
that applies to property damage.
SOUTH DAKOTA: S.D.C.L. S 58-11-9 (Supp. 1984).
. . . [f]or the protection of persons insured thereunder who are
legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of
uninsured motor vehicles and hit-and-run motor vehicles because of
bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death, resulting
therefrom.
UTAH: Utah Code Ann. S 41-12-21.1 (1981).
. . . [f]or the protection of persons insured thereunder who are
legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of
uninsured motor vehicles and hit-and-run motor vehicles because of
bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death resulting
therefrom.
VERMONT: Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 23, S 941 (Supp. 1984).
. . . [f]or the protection of persons insured thereunder who are
legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of
uninsured, underinsured or hit-and-run motor vehicles because of
bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death resulting from
the ownership, maintenance or use of such uninsured, underinsured
or hit-and-run motor vehicle.
WISCONSIN: Wise. Stat. Ann. S 632.32(4)(a) (West Supp. 1984).
Uninsured motorist.
1. For the protection of persons injured who are legally entitled
to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor
vehicles motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness or
disease, including death resulting therefrom, in the limits of at
least $25,000 per person and $50,000 per accident. The insurer may
increase the coverage limits provided under this paragraph up to
the bodily injury liability limits provided in the policy.
2. In this paragraph "uninsured motor vehicle" also includes:
. . . .

b. An unidentified motor vehicle involved in a hit-and-run
accident.
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APPENDIX B
UNINSURED MOTORIST STATUTES WHICH EXCLUDE THE PHRASE "HIT-AND-RUN"
ALABAMA: Ala. Code S 32-7-23 (Supp. 1984).
. . . [f]or the protection of persons insured thereunder who are
legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of
uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness or
disease, "including death, resulting therefrom; . . . .
(b) The term "uninsured motor vehicle" shall include, but is not
limited to, motor vehicles with respect to which:
(1) neither the owner nor the operator carries bodily injury
liability insurance;
(2) any applicable policy liability limits for bodily injury
are below the minimum required under section 32-7-6;
(3) the insurer becomes insolvent after the policy is issued
so there is no insurance applicable to, or at the time of, the
accident; and
(4) the sum of the limits of liability under all bodily
injury liability bonds and insurance policies available to an
injured person after an accident is less that the damages which
the injured person is legally entitled to recover.
ARIZONA: Ariz. Rev. Stat. S 20-259.01 (Supp. 1984).
. . . [f]or the protection of persons insured thereunder who are
legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of
uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness or
disease, including death, resulting therefrom. For the purposes
of the coverage provided for pursuant to this section, "uninsured
motorist vehicles", subject to the terms and conditions of such
coverage, includes any insured motor vehicle if the liability
v insurer of the vehicle is unable to make payment on the liability
of its insured, within the limits of the coverage, because of
insolvency.
ARKANSAS: Ark. Stat. Ann. SS 66-4003 (Supp. 1983).
. . . [f]or the protection of persons insured thereunder who are
legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of
uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness or
disease, including death, resulting therefrom;
COLORADO: Colo. Rev. Stat. S 10-4-319 (1973).
. . . [f]or the protection of persons insured thereunder who are
legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of
uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness or
disease, including death, resulting therefrom;
CONNECTICUT: Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. S 38-175c (Supp. 1985).
. . . [f]or the protection of persons insured thereunder who are
legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of
uninsured motor vehicles and underinsured motor vehicles and
insured motor vehicles, the insurer of which becomes insolvent
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prior to payment of such damages, because of bodily injury,
sickness or disease, including death resulting therefrom;
FLORIDA: Fla. Stat. Ann. S 627.727 (Supp. 1985).
. . . [f]or the protection of persons insured thereunder who are
legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of
uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness or
disease, including death, resulting therefrom.
HAWAII: Haw. Rev. Stat. S 431-448 (1976).
. . . [f]or the protection of persons insured thereunder who are
legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of
uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness or
disease, including death, resulting therefrom,
IDAHO: Idaho Code SS 41-2502 (1977).
. . . [f]or the protection of persons insured thereunder who are
legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of
uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness or
disease, including death, resulting therefrom;
INDIANA: Ind. Code Ann. S27-7-5-2(a)(2) (Burns Supp. 1984).
In limits for bodily injury or death set forth in IC 9-2-1-15
under policy provisions approved by the commissioner of insurance,
for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally
entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured
motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness or disease,
including death resulting therefrom.
KENTUCKY: Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. S 304.20-020 (Baldwin 1981).
. . . [f]or the protection of persons insured thereunder who are
legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of
uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness or
disease, including death, resulting therefrom;
LOUISIANA: La. Rev. Stat. Ann. s 22-1406D(1)(a) (West 1978).
. . . [f]or the protection of persons insured thereunder who are
legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of
uninsured or underinsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury,
sickness or disease, including death, resulting therefrom;
MONTANA: Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. s 33-23-201 (1983).
. . . [f]or the protection of persons insured thereunder who are
legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of
uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness or
disease, including death, resulting therefrom;
NEW MEXICO: S66-5-301 (Supp. 1984).
. . . [f]or the protection of persons insured thereunder who are
legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of
uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury,, sickness or
disease, including death, and for injury to or destruction of
property resulting therefrom, according to the rules and
regulations promulgated by, and under provisions filed with and
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approved by, the superintendent of insurance.
OHIO: Ohio Rev, Code Ann. S 3937.18 (Supp. 1984).
. . . [f]or the protection of persons insured thereunder who ar
legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of
uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness or
disease, including death, resulting therefrom;
PENNSYLVANIA: Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 40-2000 (Purdon 1971).
. . . [f*]or the protection of persons insured thereunder who ar
legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of
uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness or
disease, including death, resulting therefrom,
WYOMING: Wyo. Stat. Ann. s 31-10-101 (1977).
. . . [f]or the protection of persons insured thereunder who ar
legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of
uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness or
disease, including death, resulting therefrom.
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APPENDIX C
I.

UNINSURED MOTORIST STATUTES WHICH EXPLICITLY DEFINE THE CONTACT
REQUIREMENT.
A. STATE'S WITH STATUTES REQUIRING CONTACT

ALASKA- Alaska Statutes S 28.20.445(f) (1984).
If both the owner and operator of the uninsured vehicle are
unknown, payment under the uninsured and underinsured motorists
coverage shall be made only where direct physical contact between
the insured and the uninsured or underinsured motor vehicles has
occurred. A vehicle that has left the scene of the accident with
an insured vehicle is presumed to be uninsured if the person
insured reports the accident to the appropriate authorities within
24 hours.
CALIFORNIA- Cal. Ins. Code s 11580.2 (b) (West Supp. 1984).
The term "uninsured motor vehicle" means a motor vehicle ..., [or]
the owner or operator thereof be unknown, provided that, with
respect to an "uninsured motor vehicle" whose owner or operator is
unknown:
(1) The bodily injury has arisen out of physical contact of
such automobile with the insured or with an automobile which the
insured is occupying.
IOWA- Iowa Code Amu S 516A.1 (Supp. 1984)
... legally entitled to recover damages from the owner or operator
of an uninsured motor vehicle or a hit-and-run motor vehicle or an
underinsured motor vehicle because of bodily injury, sickness, or
disease, including death resulting therefrom, caused by accident
and arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of such
uninsured or underinsured motor vehicle, or arising out of
physical contact of such hit-and-run motor vehicle with the person
insured or with a motor vehicle which the person insured is
occupying at the time of the accident.
MICHIGAN- Mich. Comp. Laws S 257.1112 (1977).
Where the death of or personal injury to any person is occasioned
in this state by a motor vehicle but the identity of the motor
vehicle and of the driver and owner thereof cannot be established,
any person who would have a cause of action against the owner or
driver in respect to the death or personal injury may bring an
action against the secretary, either alone or as a codefendant
with others alleged to be responsible for the death or personal
injury. In any action commenced under this section, physical
contact by the unidentified vehicle with the plaintiff or with a
vehicle occupied by the plaintiff, is a condition precedent to
such action.
MISSISSIPPI- Miss. Code Ann. S 83-ll-103(c) (Supp. 1984).
(c) The term "uninsured motor vehicle" shall mean:
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) A motor vehicle of which the owner or operator is
unknown; provided that in order for the insured to recover under
the endorsement where the owner of operator of any motor vehicle
which causes bodily injury to the insured is unknown, actual
physical contact must have occurred between the motor vehicle
owned or operated by such unknown person and the person or
property of the insured.
NEVADA- Nev. Rev. Stat. S 690B.020 3.(e) (1957).
. . . . legally entitled to recover damages from owners or
operators of uninsured or hit-and-run motor vehicles. . . .
3. For the purposes of this section the term "uninsured motor
vehicle" means a motor vehicle:

(e) The owner or operator of which is unknown or after reasonable
diligence cannot be found if:
(1) The bodily injury or death has resulted from physical
contact of the automobile with the named insured or the person
claiming under him or with an automobile which the named insured
or such a person is occupying;
Note- this language is the product of a 1979 amendment.
NEW YORK- N.Y. Ins. Law S 5217 (Mckinney Supp. 1984).
(A) The protection provided by this article shall not apply to any
cause of action by an insured or qualified person arising out of a
motor vehicle accident occurring in this state lying against a
person or persons whose identity is unascertainable, unless the
bodily injury to the insured or qualified person arose out of
physical contact of the motor vehicle causing such bodily injury
with the insured or qualified person or with a motor vehicle which
the insured or qualified person was occupying at the time of the
accident.
(B) The word "occupying" means in or upon or entering into or
alighting from.
NORTH CAROLINA- N.C. Gen. State. S 20-279.19 (b)(3)b. (1983).
Where the insured, under the uninsured motorist coverage, claims
that he has sustained bodily injury as the result of a collision
between motor vehicles and asserts that the identity of the
operator or owner of a vehicle (other than a vehicle in which the
insured is a passenger) cannot be ascertained, the insured may
institute an action directly against the insurer:
38

SOUTH CAROLINA- S.C. Code Ann. S 56-9-850 (1976).
If the owner or operator of any motor vehicle which causes bodily
injury or property damage to the insured be unknown, there shall
be no right of action or recovery under the uninsured motorist
provision, unless
•

• . •

(2) The injury or damage was caused by physical contact with the
unknown vehicle, and
TENNESSEE- Tenn. Code Ann. S 56-7-1201 (Supp. 1984).
(e) If the owner or operator of any motor vehicle which causes
bodily injury or property damage to the insured is unknown, the
insured shall have no right to recover under the uninsured
motorist provision unless:
(1) Actual physical contact shall have occurred between the motor
vehicle owned or operated by such unknown person and the person or
property of the insured;
TEXAS- Tex. Ins. Code Ann. S 5.06-l(2)(d) (1981).
. . . in order for the insured to recover under the uninsured
motorist coverages where the owner or operator of any motor
vehicle which causes bodily injury or property damage to the
insured is unknown, actual physical contact must have occurred
between the motor vehicle owned or operated by such unknown person
and the person or property of the insured.
WEST VIRGINIA- W.Va. Code S 33-6-31(e) (Supp. 1984).
If the owner or operator of any motor vehicle which causes bodily
injury or property damage to the insured be unknown, the insured,
or someone in his behalf in order for the insured to recover under
the uninsured motorist endorsement or provision, shall:
(iii) Upon trial establish that the motor vehicle, which caused
the bodily injury or property damage, whose operator is unknown,
was a "hit and run" motor vehicle, meaning a motor vehicle which
causes damage to the property of the insured arising out of
physical contact of such motor vehicle therewith, or which causes
bodily injury to the insured arising out of physical contact of
such motor vehicle with the insured or with a motor vehicle which
the insured was occupying at the time of the accident.
B.STATE'S WITH STATUTES EXPLICITLY NEGATING THE CONTACT REQUIREMENT
DELAWARE- Del. Code Ann. Title 18 S 3902(a)(3) (Supp. 1984).
For the purpose of this section, an uninsured vehicle shall be
defined as:
(c) A hit-and-run motor vehicle that causes an accident
resulting in bodily injury or property damage to property of the
insured. Bodily injury or property damage must be caused by
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physical contact of the hit-and-run vehicle with the insured or
with an insured motor vehicle, or by a noncontact vehicle where
the identity of both the driver and the owner of such vehicle are
unknown.
Note- Prior to 1982 Del. Code tit. 18 S 18 3902 contained the
following language:
...for the protection of persons who are legally entitled to
recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured or
hit-and-run motor vehicles....
In 1982 the section was amended to define "hit-and-run."
MISSOURI- Mo. Rev. Stat. S 379.203 (Supp. 1984).
. . . who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or
operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury,
sickness or disease, including death, resulting therefrom. Such
legal entitlement exists although the identity of the owner or
operator of the motor vehicle cannot be established because such
owner or operator and the motor vehicle departed the scene of the
occurrence occasioning such bodily injury, sickness or disease,
including death, before identification. It also exists whether or
not physical contact was made between the uninsured motor vehicle
and the insured or the insured's motor vehicle.
VIRGINIA- Va. Code S 38.1-381(d) (Supp. 1984).
If the owner or operator of any motor vehicle which causes bodily
injury or property damage to the insured be unknown, and if the
damage or injury results from an accident where there has been no
contact between such motor vehicle and the motor vehicle occupied
by the insured or where there has been no contact with the person
of the insured if he was not occupying a motor vehicle, then in
order for the insured to recover under the endorsement, the
accident shall be reported promptly to either the insurer, the
Division of Motor Vehicles, on a form prescribed by the Division
for reporting accidents, or a law-enforcement officer having
jurisdiction in the county or city in which the accident occurred,
unless it is impracticable to do so, in which event, such report
shall be made as soon as reasonably practicable under the
circumstances.
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APPENDIX D
I. STATUTES REQUIRING COMPETENT EVIDENCE AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE
PHYSICAL CONTACT REQUIREMENT
GEORGIA: Ga. Code Ann. s 56-407.1 (Supp. 1984).
(a)(1) No automobile liability policy or motor vehicle liability
policy shall be issued or delivered in this state to the owner of
such vehicle licensed in this state upon any motor vehicle then
principally garaged or principally used in this state unless it
contains an endorsement or provisions undertaking to pay the
insured all sums which he shall be legally entitled to recover as
damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle,
(b)(2) A motor vehicle shall be deemed to be uninsured if the
owner or operator of the motor vehicle is unknown. In those cases
recovery under the endorsement or provisions shall be subject to
the conditions set forth in subsections (c) through (j) of this
Code section and, in order for the insured to recover under the
endorsement where the owner or operator of any motor vehicle which
causes bodily injury or property damage to the insured is unknown,
actual physical contact must have occurred between the motor
vehicle owned or operated by the unknown person and the person or
property of the insured. Such physical contact shall not be
required if the description by the claimant of how the occurrence
is corroborated by an eyewitness to the occurrence other than the
claimant.
Note- Prior to January 1, 1985 the Georgia legislature required
physical contact in those cases where owner or operator of the
offending vehicle was unknown. The above language requiring
contact only in cases lacking independent competent evidence
became effective January 1, 1985.
OREGON- Or. Rev. Stat. S 743.792(2) (1983).
(f) "Hit-and-run vehicle" means a vehicle which causes bodily
injury to an insured arising out of physical contact of such
vehicle with the insured or with a vehicle which the insured is
occupying at the time of the accident, provided:
(A) There cannot be ascertained the identity of either the
operator or the owner of such hit-and-run vehicle;
(g) "Phantom vehicle" means a vehicle which causes bodily injury
to an insured arising out of a motor vehicle accident which is
caused by an automobile which has no physical contact with the
insured or the vehicle which the insured is occupying at the time
of the accident, provided;
(A) There cannot be ascertained the identity of either the
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operator or the owner of such phantom vehicle;
(B) The facts of such accident can be corroborated by
competent evidence other than the testimony of the insured or
any person having an uninsured motorist claim resulting from
the accident;
WASHINGTON- Wash. Rev. Code S 48.22.030(2) (1984).
. . . legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators
of underinsured motor vehicles, hit-and-run motor vehicles, and
phantom vehicles. . .
(8) For the purposes of this chapter, a "phantom vehicle" shall
mean a motor vehicle which causes bodily injury, death, or
property damage to an insured and has no physical contact with the
insured or the vehicle which the insured is occupying at the time
of the accident if:
(a) The facts of the accident can be corroborated by
competent evidence other than the testimony of the insured or
any person having an underinsured motorist claim resulting
from the accident; and
(b) The accident has been reported to the appropriate law
enforcement agency within seventy-two hours of the accident.
KANSAS- Kan. Stat. Ann. s 40-284 (Supp. 1984).
. . . legally entitled to recover as damages from the uninsured
owner or operator of motor vehicle. . .
(e) Any insurer may provide for the exclusion of limitation of
coverage:
. . . .
. . . .

(3) When there is no evidence of physical contact with the
uninsured motor vehicle and when there is no reliable competent
evidence to prove the facts of the accident from a disinterested
witness not making a claim under the policy;
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APPENDIX E
I. STATUTES DEFINING "HIT-AND-RUN" OR REQUIRING AS AN ALTERNATIVE THAT
THE OWNER OR OPERATOR OF THE MOTOR VEHICLE BE "UNIDENTIFIABLE".
MARYLAND: Md. Ann. Code art. 48A, S 481A (1979).
Any endorsement or provision protecting the insured against damage
caused by an uninsured motor vehicle, contained in any policy of
insurance issued and delivered in this State, shall be deemed to
cover damage caused by a motor vehicle of which the liability
insurer is or becomes insolvent or otherwise unable to pay claims,
in like manner and to like extent as for damage caused by a motor
vehicle as to which no liability insurance exists.
Md. Ann. Code art. 48A, S 243H (Supp. 1984).
(a) Types of claims which may be made against Fund.The following types of claims arising after January 1, 1973, may
be made against the Fund under this section subject to the
provisions of this subtitle, and to the extent that the claim is
not covered by a policy of motor vehicle liability insurance:
(1) Claims for the death of or personal injury to a qualified
person or for damage to property in excess of $100, arising out of
the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle in this State
where the identity of the motor vehicle and of the operator and
owner thereof cannot be ascertained or it is established that the
motor vehicle, at the time the accident occurred, was in the
possession of some person other than the owner without the owner's
consent and that the identity of the person cannot be ascertained;
provided that

(iv) All reasonable efforts have been made to ascertain the
identity of the motor vehicle and of the owner and operator
thereof and either the identity of the motor vehicle and the owner
and operator thereof cannot be established, or the identity of the
operator who was operating the motor vehicle without the owner's
consent cannot be established.
NEW JERSEY: N.J. Stat. Ann. SS 17:28-1.1 (1985).
For payment of all or part of the sums which the insured or his
legal representative shall be legally entitled to recover as
damages from the operator or owner of an uninsured motor vehicle,
or hit and run motor vehicle, as defined in section. . .
[39:6-78], because of bodily injury, sickness or disease,
including death resulting therefrom, sustained by the insured,
caused by accident and arising out of the ownership, maintenance
or use of such uninsured or hit and run motor vehicle anywhere
within the United States or Canada;
N.J. Stat. Ann.

39:6-78 (Supp. 1985).
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When the death of, or personal injury to, any person arises out of
the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle in this State
on or after April 1, 1955, but the identity of the motor vehicle
and of the operator and the owner thereof cannot be ascertained or
it is established that the motor vehicle was, at the time said
accident occurred, in the possession of some person other than the
owner without the owner's consent and that the identity of such
person cannot be ascertained, any qualified person who would have
a cause of action against the operator or owner or both in respect
to such death or personal injury may bring an action therefor
against the director in any court of competent jurisdiction, but
no judgment against the director shall be entered in such action
unless the court is satisfied, upon the hearing of the action,
that—

(e) All reasonable efforts have been made to ascertain the
identity of the motor vehicle and of the owner and operator
thereof and either that the identity of the motor vehicle and the
owner and operator thereof cannot be established, or that the
identity of the operator who was operating the motor vehicle
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ADDENDUM

RAY PHILLIPS IVIE
IVIE & YOUNG

A t t o r n e y s for Defendant
4 8 North U n i v e r s i t y Avenue
P . 0 . Box 672
Provo, Utah 84603
375-3000
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CARBON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

LISA MARAKIS,

:

Plaintiff,

:

JUDGMENT

:

vs.

STATE FARM FIRE AND
CASUALTY CO.,
Defendant.

:
Civil No. 14,390

The above-entitled matter came on regularly and duly
before the Court en the 11th day of July, 1985, pursuant to the
parties' cross notions for summary judgment.

The Court being

fully advisee in tne premises, and having previously entered
Findings of Fact, lonclusions of Law, and an Order granting
defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, hereby enters judgment
as follows:
Defendant is awarded judgment against plaintiff, no
cause for action.
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DATED AND SIGNED this £ f

day of July, 1985.

BY THE COURT:

r
#UNNELL>; t)istrict
district Judge
BOYDD BUNNELL^

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing
Judgment, with postage prepaid thereon this /777~)day
1985, to:
Wayne B. Watson
Beverley A. Ramsey
Attorneys at Law
269t North University Avenue
Sui-e 220
Pro^o, Utah 84604

secretary

of

July,

RAY PHILLIPS IVIE
IVIE & YOUNG
Attorneys for Defendant
4 8 North University Avenue
P. 0. Box 6 72
Provo, Utah 84603
375-3000
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CARBON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
LISA MARAKIS,

:
Plaintiff,

vs.

:

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAV?

:

STATE FARM FIRE AND
CASUALTY CO.,

:
Civil No. 14,390

Defendant.

This matter having come before the Court pursuant to
plaintiff and defendant's cross motions for summary judgment,
and the Courz having reviewed the memorandum of legal points
and authorities, affidavits, and undisputed facts revealed
through discrery, and the Court being fully advised in the
premises hereby enters the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Court finds for the purpose of plaintiff's

and defendant s respective motions for summary judgment that
plaintiff, Ll3a Marakis, alleges that she was involved in a
motor vehicle accident on or about September 4, 1982.
Paragraph 6)

(Complaint,

2.

That the motor vehicle accident was alleged by

plaintiff to have occurred when her vehicle was forced from the
road by an unidentified vehicle which plaintiff further alleges
to have left the scene of the accident.
3.

(Plaintiff's Affidavit)

That the only person known to plaintiff who

witnessed the motor vehicle accident is the plaintiff herself*
(Plaintiff's Answers to Interrogatories)
4.

That the vehicle driven by plaintiff at the time

of the accident as alleged by plaintiff, was a 1976 2-door
Datsun automobile, owned by Harold J. and Mary Fowler.
(Affidavit of Mary Fowler)
5.

That at the time of the incident as alleged by

plaintiff, the vehicle was the subject of a policy of insurance
between the Fowlers and defendant State Farm Fire and Casualty
Company, Policy No. S06-3676-C25-44.

That said policy contained

provisions for uninsured motorist insurance.
6.

(Complaint)

That the policy of insurance between the Fowlers

and defendant provided for payment of damages for bodily injury
that an insured is legally entitled to collect from the owner
or driver of an uninsured motor vehicle.

That the policy

further defined uninsured motor vehicle to mean:
A "hit-and-run" land motor vehicle whose
owner or driver remains unknown and which
strikes:
a. the insured or
b. the vehicle the insured is occupying
and causes bodily injury to the insured.

Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court
does hereby enter the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Court concludes as a matter of law that the

contract of insurance between defendant and Harold J. and Mary
Fowler does not require defendant to perform under the contract
pursuant to the uninsured motorist provision of said contract
due to the fact that no physical contact between the vehicle
driven by plaintiff and the unidentified vehicle occurred.
2.

The Court further concludes that the unidentified

vehicle is not a "hit-and-run" motor vehicle within the meaning
of that term as used in Section 41-12-21.1, Utah Code
Annotated, or within the generally accepted meaning of the
term.
3.

The Court further concludes that defendant is

entitled to summary judgment against plaintiff.
DATED AND SIGNED this £<?

day of Tulyf 1985.

BY THE COURT:

•^JJUJ*

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR CARBON COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
LISA MARAKIS,
Plaintiff,

]
I
>

v.
STATE FARM FIRE AND
CASUALTY CO.,

RULING ON MOTION TO
RECONSIDER AND DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

]
Civil No. 14390

Defendant.

In this casef the Court previously granted the
motion of the Plaintiff for summary judgment finding that
there was no issue of fact and ruling that the Defendant's
insurance policy requiring physical contact as to an uninsured motorist accident was void and against public policy.
At the time the motion was granted, the Defendant had not
filed any objection to the motion or any counter-memorandum of points and authorities or any affidavits.
Thereafter, for good cause shown the Court allowed the Defendant to submit it's counter-memorandum and
agreed to reconsider the legal ruling

as originally made.

The Court has now considered the legal authorities submitted by the Defendant and has concluded it's original ruling was in error and does hereby set aside the
previous summary finding that was signed by the Court on
May 20, 1985.
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The Defendant has now filed it's Motion For Summary Judgment contending that there must be physical contact with another vehicle to put the policy into effect
under the "hit and run1* provisions.
The Plaintiff in her answers to request for admissions and in her answers to interrogatories and in her
memorandum of points and authorities, admits that there
was no physical contact between the vehicle she was driving and the vehicle that allegedly ran her off the road.
The Court has considered the cases submitted by both counsel relative to this issue and has concluded that the majority rule and the better reasoned cases require that physical contact actually take place.

The Court is of the opinion

that the generally accepted definition of "hit and run" as
used in Section 41-12-21.1 of the Utah Code and the definition as found in Section III of the policy which states "A
hit and run land motor vehicle whose owner or driver remains
unknown and which strikes the vehicle the insured is occupying or causes bodily injury to the insured" must be accepted
to mean that physical contact is required in order to create
any liability under the policy .
Therefore, the Court grants the Defendant'-s Motion
For Summary Judgment under the undisputed facts of this case
and finds that the >Rlaintiff has no cause of action against
this Defendant as a matter of law.
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In view of the Court's ruling, it is not necesary to rule on other motions and issues that are presently
pending.
The attorney for the Defendant is ordered to prepare ar formal order in accordance with this opinion.
V

Dated this

day of July, 1S85.

/ J~^r
t

> '• *'Y'

BQYD BUNNELL, DISTRICT JUDGE
/ „

'—-
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;
/

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed true and correct
copies of the foregoing RULING ON MOTION TO RECONSIDER
AND DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT by depositing
the same in the United States Mailr postage prepaid, to
the following:
Wayne B. Watson
Beverley A. Ramsey
Attorneys At Law
2696 North University Avenue
Suite 220
Provo, Utah 84604
Ray P. Ivie
Attorney At Law
P. 0. Box 672
Provo, Utah 84603
Dated tlyLs

i fr^day of J u l y ,

1985.

LAUREL A. RAMSTETTER>MINISTRATOR
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR CARBON COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

LISA MARAKIS,
Plaintiff,

)
v
'

vs.

.

STATE FARM FIRE AND
CASUALTY COMPANY,

)

Defendant.

)

RULING ON MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Civl No. 14390

In this case, the plaintiff has filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment and has supported the Motion by affidavits and a memorandum
of legal points and authorties.

The defendant has filed no objection

or opposition to the Motion within the time allowed by our Rules of
Practice.
Based upon the Affidavit submitted by plaintiff, the Court
finds that there is no disputed issue of material fact in this case
and has further concluded, based upon an examination of the legal
authorities submitted by plaintiff, that the provisions in defendantfs
insurance policy requiring physical contact before the insurance claim
is viable as to an uninsured motorist accident, is void and unenforceable
and against public policy.
THEREFORE, the Court grants partial summary judgment in favor
of the plaintiff and against the defendant on the issue of liability, and
will, upon application, set a hearing date for receipt of evidence to
establish the amount of plaintiff's damage.
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The Attorney for the plaintiff is instructed to prepare a
formal judgment in accordance with this opinion.
DATED this O

C- day of April, 1985.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby c e r t i f y
c o p i e s of

the foregoing

by d e p o s i t i n g
prepaid,

that

I mailed

t r u e and

RULING ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

t h e same i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s M a i l ,

to the

following:

Wayne B. Watson, * . C .
Beverly A. Ramsey
Attorneys a t Law
2595 North University Avenue
Suite 220
Provo,Utah

84604

Ray Phillips Ivie
IVIE & YOUNG
Attorneys at Law
48 North University Avenue
P. 0. Box 672

Provo, Utah
3Q7/7
DATED t h i s du7A

correct

84603

day of April, 1985.
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postage

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I served four (4) copies by mail
the foregoing Appellant's Brief on Appeal to the following
the

day of January, 1986:
Ray Phillips Ivie
IVIE & YOUNG
Attorney for Respondent
P.O. Box 672
Provo, UT 84603

WA^NE B. WATSON, P.C.
Attorney for Appellate

57

